Donald Trump is shifting America’s military footprint

For more than 80 years America built a military footprint to assert itself as global policeman. Now Donald Trump is redefining America’s role, with Mr Colby as the Pentagon’s policy chief. In his national defence strategy, published in January, Mr Trump criticised previous administrations that had fought “war after rudderless war” and promised a “focused” approach.

In the Middle East, though, America is not only failing to prune forces, but waging a war with Iran that has recently escalated, with four American soldiers killed in recent days and more than 100 injured since July 7th. Cuts in Europe have so far been limited and done little to bolster defences in the Pacific. Far from gaining new focus, under Mr Trump, America’s military presence remains stubbornly diffuse.

Start with Europe, which has seen the most drastic change. Mr Trump has already withdrawn two of the five brigade combat teams, each around 4,000 troops, that were sent to Europe after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Confusingly, he has said he would send an “additional” 5,000 troops to Poland, but these are likely to come from elsewhere in Europe. More important, in June the Department of War (DoW) said it was reducing by a third forces earmarked for NATO in wartime, including fighter jets, destroyers and submarines.

Further cuts may come. In June, Pete Hegseth, the secretary of war, announced a six-month review of America’s soldiers and military bases in Europe. “It will be designed to ensure that NATO is moving fast and irreversibly toward Europe leading, stepping up to take primary responsibility for the defence of Europe,” he said in Brussels. The administration favours fewer American resources in Europe, but more use of European ones—Mr Hegseth suggested that America would demand more unfettered access to European airspace and bases, some of which allies placed off-limits for the war against Iran.

How aggressively Mr Trump advances these plans depends, unusually, on Congress. The body has shown rare resistance to the president through its reauthorisation of defence spending. In December it imposed barriers to keep the president from shrinking American forces in Europe below 76,000 troops, only a few thousand short of the current level.

If progress in Europe is slower than Mr Trump would like, the hoped-for shift from the Middle East is heading in the wrong direction. America has removed all troops from Syria and will withdraw from Iraq in September. However, the war in Iran has diverted aircraft-carriers and air-defence systems, while depleting American munitions earmarked for a potential conflict with China. Around 50,000 troops are in the region, up from 40,000 before the war.

In the memorandum of understanding signed with Iran in June, America promised that it would remove forces from the “proximity” of Iran within 30 days. That now looks implausible. With its bases in the Gulf states battered by Iranian missiles, America has been running operations from more distant launchpads in Israel and Jordan. The question, whenever the war ends, is not whether America will dramatically shrink its presence in the Middle East, but what that presence will look like. Officials in Tel Aviv speak of shifting bases to Israel, where America has just one permanent deployment. But any hint of abandoning the Gulf, where leaders have cultivated close ties with Mr Trump, would be diplomatically explosive.

Donroe decisions

Whether the Americas also become a drag on resources depends on the president’s ambitions there. His national security strategy, published last year, identified the security of American soil and the wider western hemisphere as the priority. Mr Trump has already toppled one local leader, Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela, and is considering military options against Cuba. That would pull America’s stretched navy back to the Caribbean. Even more activity may follow. Recent investment in infrastructure in places such as Puerto Rico and Trinidad and Tobago suggests permanent deployments, says Jennifer Kavanagh of Defence Priorities, a think-tank.

From their vantage point in the Pacific, American admirals observe these developments—none of which does much to help them. America’s military posture in Asia has not been entirely static. In Guam, an American island 2,700km east of Taiwan, a buildup is causing housing costs to rise. Australia is upgrading a submarine base at Perth, on its west coast, which will allow American subs to stay in the region for longer. American marines have brought more potent missiles to the Philippines. Across the region, airfields are being improved and exercises are getting larger.

Nevertheless, the quantity of American troops and hardware in the Pacific has remained steady. For much of this year, America has deployed just one carrier in Asia, rather than the preferred two, the longest such gap for five years. America has 55,000-odd troops in Japan and around half that in South Korea.

The biggest changes amount to reshuffling within the region. In a speech in Seoul in January, Mr Colby praised South Korea as a “model ally” but raised eyebrows by failing to mention its main foe, North Korea. The Pentagon has toyed with the idea of withdrawing the most potent American unit, a 4,500-strong Stryker brigade, from the Korean peninsula, to focus it on China.

A huge influx of money would ease these dilemmas. Mr Trump has asked Congress for $1.5trn for the 2026-27 defence budget, a 44% rise. Even if that money were approved, it would not translate quickly into troops or equipment. Mr Colby, who once warned that America could not afford to wage multiple wars while still deterring China, now finds himself forced to craft a policy to do just that.

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