Gulf rulers are desperate to prove they are in fact strongmen

Kuwaitis have come to dread Thursdays. That is when the latest list of citizens stripped of their nationality by the emir, Sheikh Mishal al-Sabah, is published. Rights monitors say he has deprived 70,000 people plus their dependants—about 16% of Kuwaitis—of their citizenship since May 2024. They also lose access to permanent government jobs, free health care and the right to own homes and control companies. Kuwaitis say such is the humiliation, some have killed themselves.

Vehicles drive along the highway in Kuwait City on April 29, 2026. AFP

Kuwait is not alone. Gulf states face an unsettling strategic landscape: Iran and its militias in Iraq have lobbed missiles at them; Tehran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz is throttling oil and gas exports; America’s protection looks less reliable; and their business model is at risk. Unable to overcome these threats, Gulf rulers seem set on proving they remain strongmen at home. Under the cover of war, they have introduced emergency measures akin to martial law. Across the Gulf, tens of thousands have lost their citizenship or been expelled. Over 1,000 people have been arrested, including expats in the United Arab Emirates (uae) accused of filming missile attacks. In April Kuwait tightened citizenship criteria. “A national purification,” Sheikh Mishal has said.

All Gulf states bar Oman have treated their Shias, who share Iran’s faith, as potential fifth columns. The uae, home to hundreds of thousands of Iranians, has padlocked Iranian hospitals, schools and clubs. Iranian residents have been turned away, trying to return. “We should be desperate for people, given the exodus of foreigners during the war,” says a Kuwaiti royal. “They don’t see we are chasing our populations away.” A disgruntled security official is blunter: “It’s like cancer has taken over Kuwait. We’re all suspects.”

Even before the war, Sheikh Mishal had abandoned Kuwait’s status as a democratic outlier among Gulf autocrats. In May 2024 he suspended the elected parliament, which dates to 1938. He has since ruled by decree. But he has grown more draconian since the war began. Talk shows have been banned. Diwaniyas—Kuwait’s discussion forums—have been closed. Restrictions on the media extend even to WhatsApp groups of three or more. Municipal elections have been cancelled. “We’ve become a dictatorship,” says one academic.

Some Gulf security analysts fear the purge could destabilise the region’s smaller states. They are rich but have tiny populations and low birth rates. Larger neighbours—Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia—loom over them. Those stripped of nationality include foreign women married to Kuwaitis, oil executives, bankers and Kuwait’s ambassador to Britain. The constantly shifting criteria for denaturalisation are unsettling. “Why should I sacrifice my life for a country that only alienates me?” asks a stateless civil-society activist. A retired general who mobilised Kuwaitis against Iraq’s invasion in 1991 agrees. “I’m not sure everyone would fight for the country now.”

Pressure on Shias and long-term Iranian residents is reviving sectarian sentiments that had been in decline. The uae has closed Shia mosques and detained dozens of Shias, including at least two officials, on charges of belonging to a Shia terrorist group. Many Shias seek to display loyalty, replacing social-media profiles with images of their rulers and shedding the large tell-tale silver rings on their hands. To little avail. A high-ranking officer in Kuwait says hundreds of Shias have been demoted within the security services.

The rulers’ push against their Shia population is matched by the pull of an emboldened Iran. Bahraini Shias held mourning ceremonies for Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s late supreme leader. Traditionalist Shias, who favour separating religion from politics, complain that pro-Iranian activists now dominate.

Oman stands apart, pursuing ties with Iran. It seeks to join it in charging ships to traverse Hormuz. It is the only Gulf state to keep daily flights to Iran. Alone among Gulf foreign ministers, Oman’s signed the book of condolences opened by Iran’s embassy after Khamenei’s death. It hopes to capitalise on its position as one of only two Gulf states not entirely reliant on the strait, and to displace the uae as the region’s main trade gateway. To its delight, expats are relocating there, including Iranians from the uae and Qatar. Its political system remains despotic. But unlike the others, it eschews identity politics. Oman’s stockmarket has outshone the region over the past year. “Dubai’s days are over,” insists an Iranian coffee-trader who recently moved his regional headquarters to Muscat, the capital. “Now it’s Oman.”

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